This paper introduces a qualitative measure of ambiguity and analyses its relationship with other measures of uncertainty. Prob ability measures rela. ti ve likelihoods, while ambiguity measures vagueness surrounding those judgments. Ambiguity is an impor tant represent.ation of uncertain knowledge. It deals with a different type of uncertainty modeled by subjective probability or belief.
Introduction
This paper discusses a measure of uncertainty referred to as ambig1tity. This particular type of uncertainty has roots in the work of Keynes (1921) and Knight (1921) . Knight considered two types of uncertainty, measurable uncertainty or risk which may be repre sented by numerical probabilities, and unmeasurable uncertainty which cannot. Although the behavioral significance of such a distinction was questioned [Ar row, 1951] , Ellsberg (1961) in his lleminal work argued eloquently that unmeasurable uncertainty can be bet. ter understood in t.erms of the not.ion of event am biguity. Ambiguity is about reliability, credibility, or adequacy of information used for making choices. It. is not about relative support it. may give to ont' hypoth esis as opposed to another. In other words, ambiguity cannot be expressed in terms of relative likelihoods of events. Wallsten (1990) suggested that it is perhaps more ap propriate to use the term vagueness t.o describe this type of uncertainty, because vagueness is more con cerned with the specification or clarity of envisioned events than with relative likelihoods (subjective prob abilities). Thus, a rare event may have high ambiguity, whereas a highly probable event can be very unam biguous. In fact, the notion of ambiguity was men tioned by Savage (1954) , although it was dismissed as second-order probability. Marschak (1975) also viewed ambiguity as second-order uncertainty. However, it has been demonstrated experimentally that arnbiguity is a useful concept for the understanding of choice and inference [Becker and Brownson, 1964 ] [Yates and Zukowski , 1976] . Recently, Fishburn (1991 Fishburn ( , 1992 This function a is non-negative, vanishes at the empty set, and satisfies the complementary and submodular ity axioms, namely:
a( An B)+ o:(A U B):::; a( A)+ a( B). Note that (al) and (a2) imply a(8) = 0. Clearly, this numerical measure of ambiguity is very different from the traditional measure of uncertainty modeled by subjective probability. For example, axiom (a2) is strikingly different from the Kolomogoroff axiom a(..,A) = 1-o·(.4).
There are, of course, many advantages in using a nu merical function to represent ambiguity. However, in many practical situations the required quantitative in formation may not. be available for making decisions. Iu fact., in many irnportant applications, only quali tative information is required. For example, decision rules and the inference mechanism employed in expert systems a.re often not expressed in the form of a nu merical function. Therefore, in contrast to Fishburn's approach. we introduce in this paper a qualitative mea sure of a.mbiguit.y. We belie ve that t.his measure is use ful for qualitative reasoning and provides a more ap propriate framework for studying the algebraic struc ture of ambiguity.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we fi rst define a. qualitative ambiguity measure, and then introduce the notion of interval structure which forms the basis of our exposition. In Section 3, we present the main results which explicitly reveal the structure of ambiguity, and the dose relationship between am-biguity and other measures of uncertainty. 
Note that by (al) and (a2), we have:
(a4) a(e) = 0. 
Obviously, one can define a large number of lower and upper mappings from 28 to 2n. We postulate t.hat a upper mapping J : 28 _.,. 2.!? satisfies the following axwms:
It can be verified that axioms (Jl), (]2), and (]3) imply:
The corresponding lower mapping f : 28 ___, 2.!? is defined by: -
One ca. n easily show that f satisfies the following properties: -
We call the pair of mappings (f, f) defined above an interval slntcfure (Wong et a/.,-1 992 ] which was sug gested as a qualitative measure of belief.
Let. us now state ou1· first observation:
zs an ambiguity measure, namely, it satisfies axioms (al), (a2), (a3.1). and (a3.2).
Proof: Axiom (a 1) follows directly from (l.1) and (jl), i.e.,
By the definition of upper mapping,
This means that (ct2) holds.
From equation (I) and axiom (]3), we obtain:
Also, it follows from (]3) and {]4):
Hence, (a3.1) holds.
Note that:
and a(An B)n a(AUB) 
Note that by (i3) and (i4), we have:
Recall that an interval structure (!, /) may be viewed as a pair of mappings which provide the lower and upper bounds of incidence for the individual proposi tions. In fact, when the lower mapping!_ is identical to the upper mapping f, then i = f = f becomes an incidence mapping. Thus, one would expect in general that there exists an incidence mapping bounded by an interval structure, i.e. , f(A) � i(A) �/(A), VA E 2e.
(See Lemma 2 in the Appendix). v./e say that an ambiguity measure a is compatible with an incidence rnapping i, i.e., (i, a) is a compatible pair if
\Ve have shown in Theorem 1 that for a given inter val structure (!, ]), the mapping defined by f(A)-f(A), VA E 2°�is an ambiguity function. This obser vation and Lemma 1 strongly suggest that the notions of interval structure, incidence mapping, and ambigu ity measure are inter-related. The connection between these qualitative measures and other quantitative mea sures of uncertainty is also explored. Our results are summarized in the following two theorems.
Theorem 2 A pair of mappings(!,/) from 2e to 2.rt iB an interval Biructure, if and 01l.ly if there exists a compatible pair ( i, a. ) of incidence and ambiguity map pings such that: VA E 2°,
Proof: (-¢=) By axioms (al) and (il), /(0) = i( 0) U a(0) = 0 U 0 = 0. By ax ioms (a:2) and ( i2), f( e) = i( e) u a( e) = {} u {} = {}. By axioms (a3.1) and (i:n,
From equation (2) and axioms (i3), it follows:
Thus, /(AU B)= ](A) U ](B)
. By (i4) and (a2),
Therefore, (j_, /) is an interval structure.
(:::} ) Here, we want to shc�w that there exist mappings i and a such that [ and f can be expressed as:
/(A) = i(A) U a.(A), [(A) = i(A) n -,a(A), and a( A) U a( B) �a( AU B) U i(A U B),
By Lemma 1, there exists an incidence mapping i sat isfying:
Let a(A) =/(A) n-,f(A),\IA E 2°. By Theorem 1, this mapping a is an a:inbiguit.y measure. Thus,
Therefore, we obtain:
That is,
](A) = i(A) U a( A). Similarly, we have:
That is, [_(A)= i(A) n ..,a( A).

Also, /(A)= i(A)Ua(A) = -,(i(A)n-, a(A)) = ..,f(A), and -a( A) U a( B) = ( ] (A) n -,I_ ( A)) U (/(B) n -,I_( B))
C /(A) U /(B) -/(AU B) = i(AUB)Ua(AUB).
D
We close the present discussion by deriving the con nection between the qualitative measures: incidence, interval structure, and ambiguity mappings, and the qttantitative measures: probability, belief, and ambi guity functions.
Theorem 3 A pair of functions Bel and PI from 2e to [0, 1) are belief and plausible functions, if and only if there exist a compatible pair ( i, a) of incidence and ambig1tity mappings from 2° to 2n, and a probability function P on 2n Such that:
and
Pl(A) = P(i(A) U a(A)).
Proof: ( ¢:) By The_ orem 2, we can construct an in terval stt'ucture (f,f) from a compatible pair (i , a) of it!cidence and arnbiguity mappings. By Lemma 1, (!,f) can be expressed in terms of a basic assignment j� Let m(B) = P(j(B)), \IB E 2°. It follows from (j1), (j2), (j3), and t.he Kolmogoroff axioms:
Thus, the function, Bel: 2° ___,. [0, 1), defined by:
is a. belief function, and Pl(A) = P(/(A)) is the cor responding plausibility function. Using the focal elements, we can construct a finite set Q such that each w E D corresponds to a focal element B . Thus. the elements in D can be uniquely labeled by the focal elements, namely: fl = {ws I B is a focal element. We can define a probability function on 2n as:
P({wn}) = m( B) .
One can construct a basic assignment mapping j 2e-. 2n as:
Let l(A) = U scA j(B) and /(A) = -,1(-,A), VA E 2e. By Lemma l, we can immediately conclude that the pair of mappings (!,]) is an interval structure. Moreover, VA E 2e, -Bel(A) = P(1(A) and Pl(A) = P(](A)). The desired results immediately follow from Theorem 2.
0
It should be noted that P(i(A)) is a probability func tion on 2 e. The function defined by : VA E 2 e, a(A) = P(a(A)) = Pl(A)-Bel(A) is, in fact, an ambiguity function, as it satisfies the axioms (al) to (a3) suggested by Fishburn [Fishburn, 1992] .
Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced a qualitat.ive mea sure of ambiguity. This notion of ambiguity is similar to that considered by Ellsberg. Probability measures the relative judgments of likelihoods, whereas ambigu ity measures the uncertainty or vagueness surround ing those judgments. Both probability and ambigu ity are important representations of uncertain knowl edge, although they deal with different types of uncer tainty. We have also established the inter-relationship between ambiguity, belief, and probability measures from both the qualitative and quantitatire points of view. The results of this preliminary st.udy su gg est. t.ha.t it is useful to further explore the theoretical and practical issues in using ambiguity for uncert.ain reasoning.
Proof: ( =>) Given an interval structure (! ,]), we can construct a mapping j : 2 e -+ 2n as foll m;s : VA E 2 e,
BCA First, let us show that:
.
B�A
Suppose w E U B c A j(B). This means that there exists a r � A such tl ) at w E j( r). By the definition of j, w E [_(r). Since (1, f) is an interval structure, by (1_ 4) , [ (A) U i_(F) <; 1(A U F). As r <; A, we have:
Consequenlly, wE i_(A), i.e.,
Conversely, suppose w E i_(A). There are two possi bilities: w E j(.4) or w rf. j(A). If w E j(A), then w E U B c A j(B). If w rf, j(A), according to the defini tion of j(A), we have wE U B C A l(B). Thus,
::Jr C A such that wE i_(F). In this case, wE j(F) or w rf. j(F). Suppose wE j(r). Since r is a subset of A, then wE U B c A j(B). On the other hand, if w rf. j(F), according to the defi nition of j(r). we have wE UBc r [_(B). Therefore, 3d C rCA such that wE l_(d).
As 2e is a finite set., this reduction process cannot cont.inuP forever. In other words, there must be a set E C A such that. wE j(E). That is, wE U B C A j(B).
Thus. IW' obtain: -i_(A) <; U j(A).
Now, we prove that j satisfies axioms (jl), (j2), and (j:3). Since j(0) = !_(0) -U8 c0 j(B) = 1_(0) = 0, and U B�EJ j ( B) = i_ ( e)= fl, (jl) and (j2) hold.
To prove (j3). we consider two separate cases of A :j= B: (i) A �B and B �A, (ii) A<;BorB<;A.
In case (i),
and j(B)
Also, Thus, BC;e
That is, axioms (fl) and (f2) are satisfied.
U J(T) n j ( .J) . 
B�A and ] ( A)= U j(B).
BnA-t0
Using the above j, we can construct a relation C be tween e and [} as: (}Cw ¢::: :: :} (} E B and wE j(B).
This impl ies that.
Thus.
Similarly, one can show that C(A) = f(A), VA E 2 8 .
Using the relation C, we can construct anothez· relation C' between e and {) a.s follows: for every w E {), if wE j (B), select only one 8 in B such that 8C'w.
The following observations are in order:
(i) InC', every w E {) is related to one and only one () E e. In other words, C' is a function from {) to e. However, two different w 's may be mapped to the same B.
(ii) Note that (w-1)c• = { B I 8C'w } is a singleton set. This means that VA E 2 8 , 
{9}�.4
That is, C(A) � C'(A), VA E 2 8 . Thus, {il), (i2), and (i3) hold. 
